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This research assesses informal markets that dominate pharmaceutical systems in severely disrupted countries and
identifies areas for further investigation. Findings are based on recent academic papers, policy and grey literature,
and field studies in Somalia, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Haiti. The public sector in the
studied countries is characterized in part by weak Ministries of Health and low donor coordination. Informal
markets, where medicines are regularly sold in market stalls and unregulated pharmacies, often accompanied by
unqualified medical advice, have proliferated. Counterfeit and sub-standard medicines trade networks have also
developed. To help increase medicine availability for citizens, informal markets should be integrated into existing
access to medicines initiatives.Introduction
Pharmaceuticals are indispensable to health systems;
they complement other types of health care services to
reduce morbidity and mortality rates and enhance qual-
ity of life. Pharmaceuticals are unlike ordinary commod-
ities given their therapeutic properties; people rely on
them intensely for health, sometimes even life itself.
Pharmaceutical supply systems are a critical constraint
for making progress in health outcomes within the
spectrum of treatable diseases; they need to work well if
health gains are going to be made. However, owing to
pharmaceutical supply system shortcomings, the poor
continue to die from treatable infectious diseases world-
wide each year.
One of the State’s core roles in meeting essential needs
is maintaining a functioning health system with an ad-
equate supply of essential medicines, enabling its citizens
to exercise their right to a standard of living that guaran-
tees health and well-being as outlined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. As emphasized by Kohler
et al., “[r]egulation of health sector goods and services is
a core function of government. Governments are re-
sponsible for ensuring that health professionals are
licensed properly and that health products are safe and
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orthroughout developing countries given limited resources
and oftentimes less than optimal healthcare infrastruc-
ture and human resources. It is of particular difficulty in
severely disrupted states where governance is weak and
intra-state conflict can be the status quo. What is often
overlooked in many pharmaceutical systems is the im-
portance of ensuring that good governance is in place.
Governance is defined by the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (UNDP) as:
“(T)he exercise of economic, political, and administra-
tive authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels,
comprising the mechanisms, processes, and institutions
through which that authority is directed. Good govern-
ance is, among other things, participatory, transparent,
accountable, and efficient. It promotes the rule of law
and equal justice under the law. Governance requires
the involvement of the private sector, civil society and
the state and is a prerequisite for sustainable human de-
velopment” [2].
The implementation of good governance requires a
functioning state. We seek to explore what happens to
governance within the context of the pharmaceutical
system when states break down or fail. Definitions of
what characterizes a failed state are diverse but include
longstanding entrenched weaknesses. For example, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) definition includes an inability for a state to
sustain itself over time and Robert Zoellick describes the
persistence of poverty as a consequence of overlappingLtd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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[3-4]. This however does not encompass the entire def-
inition of what a failed state is. Failed states often have
a regional significance due to their negative externalities
(i.e. for smuggling and trade of counterfeit medicines)
and share common problems such as poverty, insecur-
ity, and proneness to conflict [5-6]. Given the debate
surrounding the term ‘failed state, ’ the term ‘severely
disrupted country’ will be used instead to describe the
countries under study. This term also conveys the state
of affairs in the countries under study where state
administrations, public health systems or pharmaceutical
systems function weakly, if at all.
Informal mechanisms in these instances are not sur-
prisingly resilient. In the absence of governance or with
weak governance, pluralistic health systems made up of
a collection of public and private health care providers
operate with little communication amongst each other
[7]. Walle and Ponsaers define informal markets as those
without state intervention [8]. Because they are outside
of the purview of state regulation, these markets also do
not necessarily entail ‘illegal economic activity’. When
public health systems fail to provide pharmaceuticals to
patients effectively, citizens will turn even more intensely
to private (formal and informal) providers and are often
unaware of the possible risks involved or despite those
risks. It is critical to bear in mind that there are no uni-
versal demarcations between public, private, and infor-
mal markets. For example, there may be formal and
informal dispensing of medicines taking place in public
facilities and in the private market.
Unlike unstable governments, which can fracture at
any time, the states being studied are “chronically stable”
in their inability to service their population’s needs. The
institutions, though largely ineffective, have been in
place for many years and are unlikely to change. Well
regulated institutions are usually considered to be essen-
tial to the pharmaceutical sector where medicines are
procured in large amounts and must then be checked to
ensure quality, stored properly, distributed, and dis-
pensed based on accurate diagnoses of health issues. As
it is difficult to imagine significant change in the institu-
tional structure of the states being examined in the near
future, they must be examined from a different perspec-
tive. A paradigm shift is necessary to understand how
the provision of pharmaceuticals may be made safer and
more transparent.
This paper illuminates how informal markets flourish
in severely disrupted countries. In the absence of suffi-
cient public health systems, patients are opportunistic
and turn to where drug products are available - even
though the quality and efficacy of these products may be
in question. It is difficult to draw generalizations from
the country examples we will highlight in our papergiven the unique circumstances of each country. What
we aim to demonstrate, however, is the importance of
informal markets in difficult country conditions and the
need for policy makers to address access to medicines in
a pragmatic way by working with existing conditions,
however imperfect.
We organize our article as follows: first, we present
our methods. Second, we use case studies: Afghanistan,
Somalia, Haiti, and the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) to illustrate some of the major issues facing
pharmaceutical supply in severely disrupted countries.
Each case study will characterize the public and informal
sector as pertaining to pharmaceutical supply and their
relation to the rational use of medicines and the trade
and sale of counterfeit/substandard medicines. The dis-
cussion will then compare and contrast the case studies,
drawing out key trends and proposing possible interven-
tions and areas where further research is recommended.
In this context, it is compelling to know how informal
and spontaneous healthcare provision –namely pharma-
ceutical supply - has adapted to state degeneration and
the subsequent benefits or dangers of such adaptation.
Methods
Field studies were carried out in Afghanistan, Haiti,
Somalia, the DRC, Palestine and the Central African Re-
public (CAF) as part of the research programme
“Providing Health Care in Severely Disrupted Environ-
ments: A Multi-Country Study” at the University of
Queensland. Although healthcare systems were exam-
ined as part of the programme, this paper focuses on the
pharmaceutical sector, the results of the following case
studies were the primary product of the research program:
Too good to be true? An assessment of health system pro-
gress in Afghanistan 2002–2010 (Markus Michael, 2011,
unpublished manuscript), The Somali healthcare arena. A
(still incomplete) mosaic (Enrico Pavignani, 2012, un-
published manuscript), “Résultats périssables”: An assess-
ment of the health system in Haïti (Peter S. Hill and
Markus Michael, 2012, unpublished manuscript), and
Democratic Republic of Congo. The chronically-ill heart of
Africa. Draft (Maurizio Murru and Enrico Pavignani,
2012, unpublished manuscript). Results from Palestine
were not included within the scope of this study be-
cause its environment is significantly different from
those covered in this paper, more over-governed than
under-governed. The results from the CAF were not
included as research was not complete during the pre-
paration of this paper.
Key informant interviews were conducted for all coun-
tries studied. Interviews for the Somalia case study took
place in the neighboring Nairobi and in Kinshasa, Goma
and Kindu for the DRC. In Haiti, we conducted 45 key
informant interviews in January 2011. Key informants
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rently engaged in development in Haïti, with subsequent
snowballing; a seminar convened by the Université Notre
Dame d’Haïti provided direct contact with the local pub-
lic health and academic communities, and access to the
mailing lists for coordination of health services allowed
identification of key humanitarian and development
agencies. In Afghanistan, 41 interviews were conducted
between the 26th of November and 20th of December 2010.
The sample of respondents for Haiti and Afghanistan
included representatives from the Ministry of Health,
donors, NGOs, other humanitarian organizations, and UN
agencies. Individual health professionals were interviewed
while in Afghanistan. The researcher (M. Michael) draws
on combined three years of experience with health care
provision in Afghanistan.
All field studies included a literature search as well as
document and policy analysis. Substantial efforts were
devoted to finding, analyzing and triangulating as many
documents as possible. The final reports relied to a
greater degree on existing documentation than on inter-
views, as interviews often gave little new information on
medicines. In contrast, emailing contacts gave research-
ers access to fairly unknown key documents. This was
an important methodological lesson – valuable docu-
mentation is often unknown or forgotten by involved
actors, but it does exist.
Because of time, financial and logistical constraints, it
was not possible to expand coverage in the DRC and
interview a greater number of people directly involved
in the delivery of health services at local level. Among
the main limitations of the Haiti study were the reliance
on relatively short fieldwork and on secondary informa-
tion sources to construct insights into a complex health
sector. In Afghanistan, security concerns precluded the
visit to more insecure provinces, as the researcher was
not attached to any operational organization. Another
limitation in Afghanistan was the lack of interviews in-
volving representatives from the central level of donor
institutions. We acknowledge that the choice of respon-
dents may have introduced a provider bias.Findings
Country case studies
Afghanistan
Afghanistan’s public health system is in large part a joint
effort of the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH), donors,
and not-for-profits. The private health sector ranges
from qualified health professionals (often individuals
who are also public providers) providing curative care to
individuals with no technical skills or background know-
ledge selling medicines [9-10]. The level of regulation
over the private sector varies wherein private pharmaciesand grocery store vendors may be considered to be for-
mal and market drug sellers informal.
Afghanistan’s health system has gone through exten-
sive reforms since 2002, although most reforms have
largely neglected the pharmaceutical area as well as
other support systems. Up until that time, “the pro-
longed civil war, the shortage of staff in rural areas, and
the absence of explicitly articulated national priorities all
resulted in limited availability and quality of services”
[9]. Since then, the MOPH has gone through a major re-
structuring. It has focused on providing a Basic Package
of Health Services (BPHS) and Essential Package of Hos-
pital Services (EPHS), primarily through contracting out
to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and inter-
national organizations. Some studies and public dis-
course suggest that the state’s efforts have been
reasonably successful. On the other hand, key infor-
mants pointed out that the system is fragmented, there
is a distinct lack of coordination between donors and the
ministry, and it is unclear where the accountability lies
for meeting goals [9-11]. Low coordination extends to
the public pharmaceutical sector. There is no national
supply system, nor is there one specific to the BPHS and
EPHS (except for components led by USAID, which has
outsourced to Tech Serve International).
There are three categories of vendors from whom citi-
zens may purchase medicines: private pharmacies, gro-
cery stores and street vendors. Jointly they provide at
least 70% of the essential medicines in the country [12].
Private pharmacies are registered and subject to rules,
such as the requirement that a pharmacist be on site at
all times [13]. But this is not consistently implemented,
as is commonly the case in many low and middle-
income countries [13]. Grocery store vendors are the
second level of provision and are also subject to reviews
but street vendors are not regulated thereby falling into
the informal category [13]. Cost may be a factor in the
large number of street vendors as out of pocket expendi-
tures account for 69% to 79% of health financing accord-
ing to one survey [14]. Quantitative studies have found
that citizens either preferred the private sector or rated
it equally with the public when receiving care, and the
prevalence of the pharmacies makes them a prominent
option for purchasing medicines [15,14,10].
Regulatory controls are not actively implemented and
the pharmaceutical sector as a whole is “understudied”,
‘highly complex and chaotic’ and ‘completely out of con-
trol in all respects’ [12]. Formally, quality control mea-
sures are reasonably established. Procedures are in place
to send imported products to labs for quality checking
and MOPH registration as needed. Yet even the govern-
ment admits that the quality of pharmaceuticals
imported and sold is not ensured [16]. With the
most advanced public health coverage—though with
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sible to maintain security on the border and assess the
quality of both registered and non-registered imports.
Afghanistan’s porous and non-secure border connects it
to several countries and allows multiple points of entry
for medicines. The largest supplier is Pakistan, followed
by Iran, India, China, the Middle East, and Europe [13].
Pakistan may have producers specifically targeting the
Afghan market with their pharmaceutical supply [13].
Medicines transported across these borders include both
branded and generics products as well as counterfeits
and sub-standard pharmaceuticals. In addition to
imports across Iranian and Pakistani borders directly,
medicines from Iran can go through Turkmenistan and
those from Central Asia go through Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan [13]. Although legitimate trade in medicines is
required for quality standard testing in Kabul, no screen-
ing is possible for those transported illegally.
Afghanistan’s programs cannot stop the trade of coun-
terfeit medicines. This is true in the public sector, while
in the private sector regulation is likely to be even less
effective. More structured systems possibly lead to more
structured pharmaceutical crime. For example, key infor-
mants suggested that counterfeit pharmaceuticals are
made specifically for the Afghan market, which one
study called a ‘pharmaceutical dustbin’ [12].
Somalia
Somalia’s public health facilities can be seen as those
connected to zonal health authorities, often receiving fi-
nancing from Western aid agencies. One author has sug-
gested that the public-private distinction is meaningless
and should not be used in the Somali context [17]. Pub-
lic facilities are ostensibly bound to health authority pol-
icies but are not provided financing, requiring the use of
user fees, nor overseen by them as expected [18,19]. The
‘public’ classification is therefore misleading as its
actions are commercial, with health workers acting as
sellers of merchandise. Other sources of healthcare can
include providers funded by Islamic charities, traditional
healers, and individually operated pharmacies. There are
laws governing private health facilities in Somaliland, in-
cluding pharmacies, but most private operators are un-
aware of them and they are not strongly enforced [20].
Consequently, there ought to be a formal private sector
but in reality it seems more informal.
Much of the variability in the quality and range of
health services available is due to Somalia’s unstable pol-
itical situation. The three zonal Ministries of Health
(Ministry of Health of the Transitional Federal Govern-
ment, Ministry of Health and Labor of Somaliland, and
the Ministry of Health of Puntland) operate with varying
(and overall limited) levels of influence over domestic
operations. Bilateral donors and international NGOs arethe most significant contributors to the formal health
care system but aid is uncoordinated, without common
long-term agendas. UNICEF is an important player in
the provision of primary healthcare, with a history of
supplying Mother-and-Child (MCH) Centers and Health
Posts with ration kits. But even in this program, record-
keeping and reporting of what is being supplied have
only been implemented recently.
The Somali healthcare network is diverse, active and
growing but perceptions by commentators and even
those working in the country are not commensurated
with this characterization. These inaccurate perceptions
could be explained by the lack of understanding of the
significant presence of market pharmaceutical vendors
and other private pharmacies as sources of health care.
In Somalia, the number of private pharmacies has been
growing since the 1980s. They are not restricted to
urban areas, though they are still largely concentrated
there [21]. Although public facilities are kept track of,
private pharmacies are not. One count of private clinics
and pharmacies recorded 190 providers, whereas phar-
macies alone likely number in the thousands. It is likely
that the whole pharmaceutical market, private and
donor-supported combined, represents one of the largest
sectors of the economy in value, although no records have
been kept. A study by Mazzilli et al. [20] in Somaliland
found that at least seven major importing firms were
supplying a competitive network of wholesalers that in
turn were selling products with almost 800 private phar-
macies operating in the country. The same study found
that there are close relationships between the private and
public operators. As in Afghanistan, many employees in
pharmacies were also public employees, suggesting that
the dual jobs may be coping mechanisms to ensure suffi-
cient wages for livelihood.
Marchal [22] examined the Bakaaraha market in
Mogadishu, which included a large section for medi-
cines consisting of as much as 55 stores and 350
booths and operated without any regulatory controls
and in the absence of technical skills among the medi-
cine suppliers. Not surprisingly, the quality of the pro-
ducts purchased in the market was a source of
concern and certain donor and not-for-profit funded
health facilities did not purchase medicines there be-
cause of their dubious provenance.
One key characteristic of the Somali pharmaceutical
sector is that customers tend to prefer private pharma-
cies. They have longer operating hours, the significant
number dispersed throughout the country make them
accessible to a large proportion of the population, and
high user fees discourage the use of public facilities. “Out-
lets were generally small operations, serving light client
loads with small profit margins. To make any profit the
pharmacies were extremely efficient in stock management
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Easy access to medicines through private pharmacies is in
line with the tendency of citizens to first seek traditional
care and then purchase medicines, all prior to visiting a
health facility which is viewed as simply a place to get a
prescription [23].
Somalia is critical for the pharmaceutical trade because
its duty-free conditions have made it a major import
channel for the Horn of Africa (Kenya and Ethiopia).
There are linkages between the pharmaceutical market
in Ethiopia and Somalia, but little is known about the
routes which are taken or the amount of goods that
cross the border. Drug supply routes are the least inves-
tigated segment of the health system in Somalia al-
though a study did find that most medicines in the
central Bakaarha market in Mogadishu came from Paki-
stan and India [20-22]. One informant explained that
the opaque nature of the pharmaceutical system could
in fact be deliberate to facilitate illegal business. The ease
and impunity with which counterfeit, expired or repack-
aged medicines can enter into a large market has obvi-
ous appeal to criminal networks.
Haiti
The Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) broke
divided Haiti’s health system into four sectors: 1) public;
2) private not-for-profit (NGOs and religious organiza-
tions); 3) mixed not-for-profit (private management with
staff paid by the MSPP); 4) private for-profit [24]. Yet,
functionally, informant interviews suggested the follow-
ing categorization for Haiti’s health system: 1) formal fa-
cilities, administered by the Ministry of Public Health
and Population (MSPP - Ministère de la Santé Publique
et de la Population), NGOs, or privately; 2) informal fa-
cilities and practitioners, not registered or recognized by
the MSPP and functioning outside the system; 3) indivi-
duals who play roles across these boundaries.
Lack of coordination is one of the many challenges in
Haiti, likely one of the results of a weak health system.
The earthquake has further disturbed the tenuous equi-
librium of the public health system, though any major
stressor would trigger a crisis in the fragile state. One of
the outcomes was drastic increase in the number of
NGO services operating independently of national public
and private endeavors, though there have been early
initiatives to coordinate the acute responses to cholera
under the MSPP, and to extend this to other health
issues. The MSPP has attempted to decentralize its
operations, but although work areas are divided amongst
multiple departments, financial and decision-making au-
tonomy has not devolved with them [25,26]. It has also
in large part failed to regulate other sectors, particularly
NGOs. The MSPP directly controls only 10-15% of
health services while NGOs manage most withoutcoordination. NGOs may run facilities with salaries paid
by the MSPP or they may support the MSPP in paying
the salaries to its employees in a facility. In addition,
NGOs may start their own facilities without going
through the process of MSPP authorization.
Around 40 agencies import pharmaceuticals for both
public and private markets in addition to the availability
of central stores (Program on Essential Medicine and
Supplies - PROMESS) in the public sector. This situ-
ation, along with the direct influx of pharmaceuticals
through international actors, has limited government’s
capacity to track the amount of medicines being distrib-
uted in the country, making it difficult to accurately pro-
ject needs. The tension between the MSPP and NGOs is
apparent in the recent attempt by the government to
regulate imports. Registration policies have resulted in
document processing delays of as long as six to nine
months. Even though this presents some administrative
delays for NGOs, it does help manage the quality of
drugs at an early stage due to a lack of centralized distri-
bution channels and poor quality drugs being able to
enter through NGO supply channels as well as informal
ones [25]. Furthermore, the new registration policies are
meant to help avoid duplication and facilitate coordin-
ation. This can only work if NGOs cooperate and supply
through the government’s procedures and if the govern-
ment manages the scheme competently and honestly. In-
dependent supply lines, however allow organizations to
avoid them. A committee has also been set up with a
long term aim of coordination but it remains in the early
stages and focused on information sharing.
Unfortunately, the regulation of imports has not
extended to street vendors, who are part of the informal
sector (according to the second categorization of Haiti’s
health services). These vendors “échappe à tout con-
trôle” (avoid all efforts of control) [27]. Street vendors
and unregistered pharmaceutical sellers offer a range of
antibiotics and popular analgesics. In addition, trad-
itional medicine is recognized, even by senior health au-
thorities, as the one health system “with 100% coverage”.
Numerous factors inform individuals’ decisions to seek
traditional health care, but limited access to health ser-
vices and products is a particularly strong reason. In
Artibonite there were only 2.7 health professionals for
every 10,000 inhabitants. According to another study,
60% of the poorest households do not seek care due to
costs [28]. Patients are responsible for the costs of medi-
cines as well as other supplies when seeking procedures
at public hospitals [29].
Policies aimed to curb the influx of counterfeit and
substandard medicines are still in the early stages in
Haiti. Haiti’s public sector primarily seeks procurement
through the World Health Organization (WHO) sup-
ported PROMESS where at least some quality control
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necessary and local production is not well developed,
not regulated, and not subject to quality control [30]
[25]. Even imported pharmaceuticals (both through pub-
lic and NGO channels) are not of guaranteed quality,
though as mentioned earlier, importers and eligible phar-
maceuticals must now be registered, which is a positive
development [30,25].
DRC
The DRC has a significantly decentralized public health
system that includes many public-private partnerships
[31]. With regards to the private sector, the 2005 World
Bank Health, Nutrition and Population status report
mentioned three different categories: private pharmacies,
medicine sellers and informal healers [31]. Private phar-
macies are headed by registered pharmacists and should
be licensed, although the sheer number of private phar-
macies makes this difficult to enforce [31]. As a result,
though medicine sellers and healers are clearly more in-
formal, the place of private pharmacies is not as evident.
The public health sector is decentralized on the one
hand, with 515 Health Zones, but with a central report-
ing structure to the Ministry of Health [31]. In practice,
it is difficult to see how regulation can be enforced by
the Ministry of Health, which is extremely fragmented
itself (13 Directorates and 52 Special Programmes at the
central level, 11 Provincial Health Directorates and 65
Health Districts at the mid-level). The number of Health
Zones was officially increased from 306 to 515 in 2001,
but without the resources to support them, many old
and new Zones are ghost structures and some were sim-
ply not put in place. Half of the country’s hospitals and
health units are run by private institutions, churches and
non-governmental organizations, “while the other half is
state-run with no resources and personnel who have no
equipment or medical supplies to work with. The public
health system is still in “total collapse” [32].
Currently, the pharmaceutical supply chain is frag-
mented between private, public, and public-private
groups [33]. A recent WHO study identified 19 procure-
ment agencies with 52 partners, along with 99 distribu-
tion channels for different vertical programs [33]. The
government set up the Système National d’Approvision-
nement en Médicaments – National System for the Pro-
curement of Medicines (SNAME) and the Programme
National d’Approvisionnement en Médicaments – National
Programme for the Procurement of Medicines (PNAM)
in 2002. The system is founded on numerous autono-
mous not-for-profit agencies which include two pro-
curement agencies and 15 local distribution stores.
Though the concept is good, insufficient participation in
SNAME limits its effectiveness and makes coverage of
the health sector incomplete. While medicines in thepublic sector are procured through donors and NGOs a
study which surveyed at least 39 private pharmacies
found no connection to the public system in their pro-
curement strategies; most used local suppliers [33,34].
The DRC facilities buy drugs from a variety of sellers,
ranging from the professional to the plainly fraudulent.
Their purchasing rationale is accordingly varied, from
concern for the health of patients to the profit-
maximizing one.
Both the private and informal sectors are important
parts of the DRC pharmaceutical market. Informal busi-
ness activities in general are integral to most citizens.
The majority of citizens engage in some sort of informal
activity, including 90% of Kinshasa’s population [35].
Surveys have found many private pharmacies in urban
areas but even suburban and rural regions have drug
shops [36]. Although they are not regulated and quality
is questionable some surveys suggest almost a third of
citizens prefer medicine sellers over “formal sector prac-
titioners” [31]. A study of 39 pharmacies suggested that
private pharmacies are not necessarily a safer choice;
42% did not have a pharmacist on the payroll and 38%
had no prescription records [31]. In the past, the govern-
ment did make an attempt to regulate the sale of phar-
maceuticals. However, a strict approach was used which
precluded the participation of informal sellers such as
those in markets and consequently resulting little to
change their practices [37].
As in all countries, numerous factors contribute to the
choice of healthcare provider. Cost is a definite consider-
ation, often leading to no treatment. The largest share of
household expenditures (41%) goes to the purchase of
medicines and high user fees for healthcare were shown
to be a cause of underutilization – when the Health
Zone of Rwanguba, North Kivu dropped user fees,
utilization increased by 4.5 times [38,39]. But it is not as
straightforward when types of providers are broken
down. For example, drug sellers are more popular with
the poor in urban areas while in rural areas they are
more likely to be used by those who are better off [31].
The use of traditional medicine has not been quantified
but is believed to be high [40]. The MSP quoted unrefer-
enced surveys when noting that 70-80% of the popula-
tion used traditional medicine [41]. A few small-scale
surveys have found relatively low usage rates, but these
low results are not in line with the received wisdom and
trends in other countries [31]. Overall, there is a distinct
lack of information on health-care seeking behavior and
consequently the relative place of medicine sellers and
other pharmaceutical actors within it.
Trans-border trade has not been examined in detail,
but may account for a significant portion of the econ-
omy where it has been studied and likely exists in other
areas as well [42]. The sale of DRC produced medicines
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tent of the smuggling of pharmaceuticals out of the
country is unknown but it does occur.
Discussion
Formal actors
The public sector of the health care system is where the
involvement of donors, NGOs, and multilateral institu-
tions is most evident. Arguably, donors are able to
produce the most concrete outcomes in vertical, dis-
ease and location specific programs. As well, even in
“normal” states there are ample challenges in human
resources (both too low and too high), inefficient man-
agement, weak institutions, weak oversight and a lack
of sufficient health infrastructure, to name a few. Se-
verely disrupted countries present these challenges and
more.
Multilateral institutions, other donors, and NGOs
were important actors in all of the countries examined.
They were an integral part of all of the health systems,
either taking charge of facilities or providing care when
government facilities could not. Lack of coordination
among all of them was a key issue in all of the case stud-
ies. Efforts have been made to address this in some
countries. For example, Somalia had a coordinating
body for aid agencies but its effectiveness has declined
over time. In Haiti, the lack of connection between
aid agencies and the government is a concern; seeking
authorization from the government is treated as a
barrier rather than an indication of institutional develop-
ment. Lack of coordination has resulted in the fragmen-
tation of drug supply. One major area is the use of
varied procurement techniques in the same country. All
of these organizations form a critical part of the health
system in severely disrupted countries and their constant
presence is unlikely to change. The weak public health
systems in each country have driven much of the public
to other sources, such as private pharmacies and
pharmaceutical vendors. Perception of low quality, low
access, and high costs of use can result in use of these
sources and lead to high-risk actions. The result of this
transition is that individuals purchase pharmaceuticals
without proper diagnoses and are at higher risk of
obtaining counterfeit or sub-standard pharmaceuticals,
raising the possibility of dangerous outcomes such as re-
sistance to medications and death. These pharmaceuti-
cals are also making individuals poorer without giving
any health benefits.
Informal supply
In the context of severely disrupted countries, we argue
that it is not helpful to separate formal and informal
markets completely: the relationship between the two
markets is often symbiotic, with the systems supportingeach other to varying degrees. But when dealing with
pharmaceuticals there is a danger inherent to informal
markets must be acknowledged. Improper pharmaceut-
ical consumption can lead to pharmaceutical resistance
and in the worst-case scenarios - death. The absence
of enforceable regulation to avoid such outcomes is
not necessarily limited to the informal markets; often
there are insufficient resources to manage the supply
of medicines in the public sector, putting the patient
at risk.
Better understanding about the informal markets is
needed among health care providers and donors. Further
investigation to understand both their approximate
numbers and distribution is critical to better under-
standing the role of these providers.
The framework of formal and informal markets is ul-
timately very limiting in examining the healthcare and
pharmaceutical system. Each case study has a unique
breakdown of service providers. At times there was a
distinct public/private division on paper (Afghanistan
and Haiti), but it was less clear in Somalia and the DRC.
In practice the distinctions are blurred in all contexts,
the difference being the increased visibility of the
phenomenon in Somalia and the DRC. The formal/in-
formal distinction is even more difficult to make.
Regulations exist on paper in all countries but they
are routineley ignored and when enforced they tend
to be harmful. Basing the division on at least some
type of enforcement being in place, in Afghanistan
and possibly the DRC, formal and informal providers
in the private sector could be distinguished. In con-
trast, basically all providers were informal in Haiti
and Somalia. The area of informal sale of pharmaceu-
ticals in the public sector was not covered in these
case studies due to limits in available information but
the category cannot be ignored and warrants greater
research.
Traditional medicine was part of the health sector in
each country as well. When seeking to understand infor-
mal healthcare providers, healers and other traditional
medicine practitioners cannot be excluded. In Haiti,
Somalia, and Afghanistan they were often the first point
of contact for patients, particularly in rural regions. In-
formation on the DRC is not as clear. Small scale studies
imply that they do not play as big a role, this goes
against reports from the Ministry of Health and what is
known about the use of traditional medicine in other
countries [31].
The establishment of private pharmacies and pharma-
ceutical vendors as sources of health care information
can have a negative impact on the rational use of medi-
cines because oftentimes information is biased, incorrect
or simply not provided. But the entrenchment of the pri-
vate pharmacy as an alternative to state pharmaceutical
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reforms around it must be implemented carefully to
work towards raising their quality bar in terms of patient
services and health outcomes. Over-regulating the sector
could drive it further underground, endangering the
public health situation further, suggesting that coopera-
tive regulation is needed. The public is not necessarily
opposed to regulation, so long as it leads to a better
provision of service, not worse. Lessons could be drawn
from countries like Nigeria where patent medicine ven-
dors have organized amongst themselves to maintain
some control over the services provided [43]. Although
there was insufficient communication between the gov-
ernment and the patent medicine vendors, existing asso-
ciations of the vendors attempted to regulate seller
actions.
Rational medicines Use
Irrational use of medicines is a broad area encompassing
inappropriate prescription practices, the sale of pharma-
ceuticals and how well patients follow their pharmaceut-
ical regimen [44]. Rational use of medicines is affected
by the quality of the health system, in terms of where
patients go for care and where they fill out their pre-
scriptions. Quality also includes the perceptions of the
patients on the care they receive and the pharmaceuti-
cals that are prescribed. Irrational medicines stem in
part from the perception of low quality public health
care systems as well as a weak understanding of the im-
pact of improper use of medicines. On the other hand,
the easily accessible and low priced pharmaceuticals sold
in markets must also attract customers as a rational,
price-sensitive appraisal of available options for care.
Common practices include providing medicines without
prescriptions, improper diagnoses due to lack of training
and business considerations, and perceptions that more
pills mean more improvement in health status. Consist-
ent to this logic, ‘free’ medicines are deemed to be value-
less. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence supporting
the idea that families prefer buying expensive medicines
that they believe, because of the supposed high value,
are more powerful.
One of the prominent trends across the four countries
was the fact that accessibility of public health care did
not explain the large amount of drug sellers. The great-
est concentration of sellers was usually found in urban
areas, where there is likely a greater amount of public
health facilities as well. One caveat to this observation is
that there has been insufficient research to determine
the distribution of drug sellers in rural regions. Never-
theless, it is clear that they are an important part of the
healthcare sector in urban areas and access should not
be excluded as a concern altogether. In Somalia, the long
operating hours of non-public pharmacies was anattractive aspect for citizens. Therefore, while mobility
may not be a major limiting factor, hours of operation
can be. Several other factors likely direct citizens to drug
sellers. Out of pocket expenditures form a large portion
of health financing in each country, making cost a likely
concern. Although their prices have not been examined,
it is reasonable to believe that their need to compete
amongst each other has resulted in lower prices. As well,
as was the case in the DRC, citizens in any of the coun-
tries may believe that any pill represents curative care.
Drug sellers regularly sell without prescriptions, and at
times, may even take on the role of the prescriber with-
out any of the necessary training.
Given the inherent danger and opportunity costs in
the irrational use of medicines, this is an area where
strategic interventions could be targeted. Implementing
educational campaigns to highlight the risks involved in
poor prescribing practices is one low cost intervention
that could potentially alert more of the patients to po-
tential risks. In addition to demand-side initiatives,
supply-side incentives must be deployed.Counterfeits
The definition of a counterfeit medicine varies among
countries but the most widely accepted definition is
given by the WHO as a medicine.
“(W)hich is deliberately and fraudulently mislabeled
with respect to identity and/or source. Counterfeiting
can apply to both branded and generic products and
counterfeit products may include products with the cor-
rect ingredients or with the wrong ingredients, without
active ingredients, with insufficient active ingredients or
with fake packaging” [45].
Counterfeit medicines fall under the classification of
substandard pharmaceuticals, which are those manufac-
tured below certain standards of quality and thus not
therapeutically active. When the medicines are harmless
in terms of toxicity, public health is still damaged as
patients go untreated. Issues of counterfeit medicines
are closely entwined with security concerns in severely
disrupted countries due to the lack of the government’s
ability to sufficiently monitor products going in and out
of the country. As the quality assurance mechanisms ne-
cessary to manage substandard medicines in particular
require significant resources and skills, it can be argued
that there is a disincentive for pharmaceutical manufac-
turers to address the issue [46]. Substandard pharmaceu-
ticals are not necessarily a product of counterfeit
pharmaceutical manufacturing. Instead pharmaceuticals
manufactured in legitimate factories are subject to differ-
ent controls depending on the target country [46].
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chain is a problem for all countries across both the pri-
vate and public sectors. Each of the studied countries
has had challenges in implementing regulations and es-
pecially in enforcing them. The porous borders in
Afghanistan make it difficult to monitor imports, and
though quality control policies are in place by law, they
are not consistently enforced. In Haiti, the government
has made an effort to begin monitoring imports but has
met resistance from NGOs and other aid organizations
because of resulting delays. Though this is a problem in
emergency situations such as the cholera epidemic,
according to informants it has also played a role in limit-
ing dumping of medicines which are not needed. Most
policies are in early stages, making it impossible to con-
clusively evaluate their strength. However, policy-makers
should also keep in mind that these systems will never
work perfectly, particularly in the regulation of informal
sellers. Compromises will have to be made. The differ-
ence in quality between public, private and informal
drug vendors varies by country, though often informa-
tion is simply not available (as in the DRC). In Somalia,
public hospitals would not purchase from market sellers.
In Haiti, drugs being supplied through NGOs were not
necessarily of optimal quality either, and at times they
simply were not needed.
The area with the least amount of information avail-
able is unsurprisingly the trade of counterfeit medicines.
It is evident that there is a significant counterfeit trade
occurring both in Somalia and Afghanistan. Less is
known about Haiti and the DRC, which definitely does
not mean that it does not occur. For all of these coun-
tries, an attempt to map out the different sources of
medicines outside the main supply channels is needed to
allow for more informed decision-making when addres-
sing the issue of counterfeits in both the public and pri-
vate sectors.
Understanding the networks of the import and sale of
counterfeit and sub-standard pharmaceuticals is integral
to a deeper understanding of the informal markets. Bet-
ter interventions can be developed which do not elimin-
ate the informal market but make it safer for citizens.
Importantly, wholesalers are the most common source
of pharmaceuticals in the countries examined [23,37,13].
Though regulating quality at the point of sale may be
difficult, targeting wholesalers could be considered as a
feasible way to ensure better quality of pharmaceutical
supplies in less than optimal pharmaceutical systems.
Future directions
In our paper we have highlighted the importance of in-
formal pharmaceutical supply systems in severely dis-
rupted countries for people in need. In the absence of a
functioning public sector, we found that informal supplysystems necessarily thrive. While some of these systems
work well enough to provide medicines to patients,
others not surprisingly remain weak at best. Still, in the
absence of formal supply, these systems provide some
degree of pharmaceutical services to those in need, albeit
they are far from perfect. Recognizing this reality, we
propose a pragmatic approach to dealing with the infor-
mal pharmaceutical markets in states where public ser-
vices are either non-existent or severely limited. We
thus support that informal supplies of pharmaceutical
systems need to be recognized and enhanced if we hope
to make sustainable change to pharmaceutical supply to
those in need. We indeed recognize the importance of
supporting state capacity strengthening where it is feas-
ible and realistic to do so, but simultaneously efforts
should be directed to developing the informal sector as
well. In other words, we support a top-down and
bottom-up approach to pharmaceutical services.
Possible interventions should focus on monitoring
current pharmaceutical supply strategies and tactics to
identify areas where interventions are most relevant and
likely to yield the biggest results in terms of public
health and in improving the education of the population
about the rational use of medicines. If patients continue
to turn to the informal sector for their drug supply, edu-
cation of these informal sellers is vital so they at least
have a basic understanding of the product they are pro-
viding. Encouraging the use of prescriptions could also
improve outcomes but would require closer integration
of sellers with the public health system. The difficulty of
coordinating the public sector itself suggests that it
would be difficult to deepen the infrastructure to include
the private sector. But any intervention must take stock
of the motivations of the informal providers: without the
right incentives, they will likely not adopt a desirable be-
havior, regardless of training [32]. For example if there is
no competition for pharmaceutical supply, such as when
a pharmaceutical seller has a monopoly in a remote vil-
lage, prices can instead reflect what the market will
allow for, and put additional financial burden on the
poor.
We have focused on non-traditional methods of pro-
viding access to medicines to patients in need. We be-
lieve the informal market suppliers should be integrated
into any existing initiatives that aim to improve access
to medicines. While donor programmes can undeniably
help fill in the gap, they are clearly not fixing the
problem but rather allowing for temporary solutions to
long-term problems. While it is desirable to advance the
development of the “ideal” pharmaceutical system, these
efforts may in fact result in very little gains in the con-
text of a severely disrupted country. For instance, in
Somalia, the privatization of the pharmaceutical supply
system is both extensive and deep, so outside efforts
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tem would have a limited impact.
We work with the reality that members of the popula-
tion will seek out pharmaceutical products from avail-
able sources, such as private pharmacies and informal
vendors. It is evident that in the face of weak public
healthcare systems, creative but unregulated options
emerge in terms of pharmaceutical supply. These, how-
ever, may only represent interim coping mechanisms.
Still, they need to be integrated when developing policy
options for further interventions that aim to help im-
prove the quality, consistency and access of the popula-
tion to medicines.
Where private pharmacies are providing services be-
yond the sale of medicines, these can be scaled up to
produce available health care services when public sector
fail, but there is a need for the training of these pharma-
ceutical sellers even if they are not qualified health care
professionals. This could include education on strategies
for identifying substandard and counterfeit pharmaceuti-
cals and basic information on medicine use. In the con-
text of state break-down, traditional models are desirable
but not realistic. We thus advance less than perfect, but
realistic solutions to pharmaceutical supply for those in
need.
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